

Mission Configurable Self Protection Solutions



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The problem in a nutshell



- Plethora of threat types
- Threat type Center of Gravity changes with phase of conflict
- Limited platform flexibility to effortlessly receive new capabilities
- Current airborne EW systems does not address all relevant threats
- Industry (and user) tend to dig in the same ditch

The million \$ question is: What do we do about it?



Survivability

- The mission
 - Increased Aircraft Combat Survivability (P_s)
 - Susceptibility to threats (P_H)
 - Threat vulnerability ($P_{K}|_{H}$)
 - Maximizing $P_s = 1 P_H P_K |_H$ (1- Susceptibility * Vulnerability)
 - Increased combat effectiveness
 - Achieve as many successful landings as take-offs...





Survivability enhancement factors

- Preventive / Tactical
 - Arms control
 - Port and border security
- Tactics
 - Flying tactics and operating procedures
 - Speed / altitude
 - Situational awareness
 - ConOps
- Technical
 - Hardening of structure
 - Ruggedized airframe
 - Blast protection
 - Signature reduction
 - System redundancy
 - Countermeasures



Type of threats











- Small arms
- MANPADS (SA-7, SA-14, SA-16, SA-18, HN-5, FN-6)
- IR AAM (AA-8, AA-11)
- IR SAM (SA-9, SA-13)
- RF AAM (AA-9, AA-12)
- RF SAM (Command type, SA-2, SA-3, SA-4, SA-5, SA-6, SA-8, SA-10, SA-15)
- IR/RF AAM (also IR/SARH Semi Active Radar Homing, AA-2, AA-6, AA-7, AA-10)
- CLOS (LLTV, Wire, Radar, Radio)
- Beam riders
- AT/RPG (RPG-7)
- AIED















Outset of conflict



Increasingly simplistic <= **Possibility to decoy** => Increasingly difficult



A bit into (recent) conflicts




Increasingly simplistic <= **Possibility to decoy** => Increasingly difficult



The desired EW toolbox

- Missile warning
- Laser warning
- Radar warning
- Hostile fire indication
- Reactive dispensing (chaff and flare)
- Pre-emptive dispensing (chaff and flare)
- Post-emptive dispensing (chaff and flare)
- RF jamming
- Directed energy system
- Hardkill system



Layers of protection







A few pieces of the puzzle

- Interfaces
 - Mechanical
 - Control
 - Power
 - HMI
- Incompatibility drives cost and schedule






Addressing the issues

Example of Initiatives

- BOL
- BOH
- TIPS






BOL

- Operational in several Air Forces
- Electromechanical dispensing
- Installable into;
 - Launcher
 - Conformal housing
 - Pylon
 - Vacant external store volume
- Reactive dispensing
- Pre-emptive dispensing
- Post-emptive dispensing
- Combat proven
- Solution > 2000 BOL Dispensers delivered, still counting..





BOL track record





Addressing the cost / schedule issues

Ø

Interfaces

- Mechanical
- Control
- Power
- HMI

Installable into;

- Launcher
- Conformal housing
- Pylon
- Vacant external store volume

Control means

- Discrete signals
- MIL-STD-1553
- RS-485
- (wireless if needed..)


Power

- 115VAC / 400 Hz
- 28 VDC in the works

HMI

- External BIT indication
- Dovetail into existing CMDS architecture






BOL Dispensing





BOL mechanism



SAAB

BOL decoys





BOL Chaff Packs

BOL IR Packs



BOL chaff

Characteristics


- Electromechanically dispensed
- Individually packed
- Affordable
- Safe to handle
- Superior effectiveness
- >10 m² RCS all frequencies
- >10 m² doppler content
- Frequency coverage 2-18 GHz






BOL chaff

• Chaff dispensed from the wings use the vortices to enhance RCS build and to generate Doppler contents







BOL chaff





BOL IR

Characteristics

- Electromechanically dispensed
- Pyrophoric
- Covert, almost
- NVG compatible
- Individually packed
- Mechanically dispensed
- Safe to handle
- Superior effectiveness





BOL IR

- IR IR
 - Pre-emptive
 - Effective for both ground based (MANPADS) and airborne (AA) threats
 - Avoid missile acquisition (Acquisition denial)
 - Missile tracks IR energy in decoy, decoy cools → missile reattempt to acquire





Pre-emptive dispensing



BOL IR Dispense from F-14





BOL IR Dispense from S-3





BOH, the idea

- In the leanest possible way provide additional advanced countermeasures capability
- Use the same electrical and hardware interfaces common missiles
- Facilitate carriage on missile launchers
- Adapter to allow mounting using 14" or 30" NATO lugs
- Incorporate mature technologies
 - BOL electromechanical dispenser
 - Forward firing (pyrotechnical) dispenser
 - Missile Approach Warning
- Reuse existing technology, products, modules and building blocks to minimizing development cost/lead-time and risks

On a mission-to-mission basis, BOH is a "missile-replacement" providing EW capability




System building blocks

BOL (electromechanical RF and IR dispenser)

- IDAS (Integrated Defensive Aids Suite)
 - EWC (controller)
 - MAW (Missile Approach Warner)
 - LWS (Laser Warner Sensor)
 - BOP (Pyrotechnical dispenser)
 - SPU (Safety Pin Unit)








Main BOH configurations and layout

Prototype BOH-200


Config#	Nose	Front module	Center module	Aft module
BOH-100	Fairing*	-	SPU, EWC	BOL
BOH-200	Fairing*	BOP	SPU, EWC	BOL
BOH-300	MAW*	BOP	SPU, EWC	BOL

* GPS optional






BOH-200 building blocks










LWS

Addressing the cost / schedule issues




- Installable any missile launcher;
 - LAU-7, LAU-120 series, MML etc. etc.
- Control means
 - Autonomous (if mode selected)
 - Discrete signals
 - MIL-STD-1553 (weapons MUX Bus)
 - RS-485
 - (wireless if needed..)
- Power
 - 115VAC and 28 VDC (missile power)
 - RAT coming
- HMI
 - External BIT indication
 - Dovetail into existing CMDS architecture
 - Integration via SW



BOH decoys









Standard 118 size



Standard 218 size



BOZ EC trials






BOZ EC trials





BOH on USAF LAU-129 Launcher (for F-16)




TIPS

- A new initiative for an airborne hardkill capability
- Philosophy; "Defeat incoming threats regardless of guidance technology, if guidance is at all installed"
- Product status: Feasibility assessment



Statistics, Iraq

AMERICAN MILITARY HELICOPTERS DOWNED IN IRAQ²⁷




Total through June 30, 2011: 75 NOTE ON AMERICAN MILITARY HELICOPTERS DOWNED IN IRAQ TABLE: Of the 75 helicopters downed in Iraq since May 2003, at least 36 were downed by enemy fire.

Source: Brookings Institute http://www.brookings.edu/saban/iraq-index.aspx




Threat characteristics





Threat characteristics

- Threat characteristics
 - Highly transportable
 - Portable by a single person
 - Designed to fly...
 - On-board propellant
 - Similar physical attributes
 - Similar in-flight velocity
- TIPS to counter threats with the following parameters
 - Speed:
 - Mass:
 - Body/warhead diameter:
 - Altitude:
 - Range to shooter:



* Envisioned minimum



Considering existing platform infrastructure

- It is desirable to utilize existing platform EW system to the greatest possible extent
 - Philosophy; "Add a new component or function to an EW system and have it work seamlessly with a minimum of required changes to existing system"
 - Considering above aspects results in the following approach for TIPS
 - Already installed Missile Approach Warner system shall be used to detect and declare an incoming threat
 - Already installed CMDS shall be used as infrastructure to launch TIPS interceptor(s)
 - Already installed safety logic (safety pin(s) and WoW) shall be used



TIPS, what is it?

- Threat Independent Protection System (TIPS*) is <u>not</u> a standalone system but rather new components which are installable into the existing EW system complementing the chaff and flare capability with the introduction of a guided Interceptor adding the capability to defeat threats like RPG's
- TIPS components




- Required updates to existing EW system
 - SW update in the MAW system to feed data to Interceptors via Transceiver
 - Update to the CMDS Mission Data File to consider the new "loadtype"

The new magazine with Interceptors is "just another loadtype" in the CMDS architecture



Addressing the cost / schedule issues




- Installable into existing dispensers
- Control means
 - Autonomous mode
- Power
 - Power via dispenser
 - Internal power pack

HMI

- External BIT indication
- Dovetail into existing CMDS architecture




TIPS dovetailing in with IDAS Example, simplified block diagram






TIPS dovetailing in with ALE-47 Example , simplified block diagram





Interceptor simulation, preliminary data





Summary

- Self Protection System products exists that are easy to fit and remove
- These systems provide advanced warning and dispensing
- A Self Protection System is emerging that provide a hardkill capability, TIPS is the name



Questions?





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